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Introduction 
Executives are scrutinizing the value of their business’ information assets with 
increasing vigilance.  The ubiquity of information technology (IT) as a critical 
dependency appearing at some, if not all, nodes in a supply chain engenders the concern 
for the integrity and availability of the IT so as to avoid undue interruption to service.  
Furthermore, organizations handling data deemed highly sensitive assume culpability for 
assuring the confidentiality, integrity and authorized availability of these assets under the 
perils of severe sanctions.  Finally, societal concern over the uncertainty of digital 
privacy fosters an atmosphere of anomie in the handling of sensitive data and reticence 
for sharing information with stakeholders. 
These observations contextualize the role of information security in the corporate 
environment; access control is the keystone to any information security initiative.  
Conventional access control models for unstructured and semi-structured data describe 
the document as the indivisible boundary around which controls are established and 
enforced.  This paradigm doesn’t account for variance of content sensitivity within a 
document.  As disparate organizational roles collaborate on a document the potential 
increases for a modicum of information deemed confidential by one of the roles to poison 
the document channel, rendering it inaccessible to stakeholders who would otherwise 
have a legitimate operational need for accessing the document.  A scenario such as this 
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casts doubt on the efficiency of current document access control models.  Deductively we 
posit the following hypotheses: 
H₁: Fine grained, redactive mechanisms will improve access control efficiency. 
H₂:  Document content uniformity positively correlates with access control efficiency. 
 
In order to explore the validity of these suppositions we proceed with a review of 
relevant literature.  
Literature Review 
Businesses are under increasing pressures to assure the security of their 
information assets.  A survey conducted by Ponemon Institute LLC concludes “the costs 
to notify victims of [a data] breach increased … from approximately $510,000 to 
$560,000. A key factor is the increase in laws and regulations governing data breach 
notification” (March 2012, p. 3).  Additionally, the residual effects of reputation loss can 
be catastrophic to organizations both in terms of reduced productivity and customer 
loyalty (Ponemon Institute LCC, January 2012).  Thus, if an organization seeks to 
establish and maintain a propitious posture in today’s marketplace, threat vectors leading 
to egregious privacy violations or confidentiality breaches must be carefully considered. 
Assessing risks and implementing appropriate protections for information assets 
requires significant interdisciplinary cooperation and a long-term commitment of 
resources.  This can be evidenced in the information security concept of least privilege.  
To illustrate the importance of this concept Mutch and Anderson observe, “it is generally 
accepted that a central goal of HIPAA as well as every other industry, governmental, and
regulatory compliance statute is the implementation of least privilege” (2011, p. 149).  
However as Hu, Ferraiolo and Kuhn point out least privilege can be difficult and costly to 
 4 
achieve as it “requires identifying the user’s job functions, determining the minimum set 
of privileges required to perform those functions, and restricting a user to a domain with 
those privileges and nothing more” (2006, p. 8).  At a minimum these activities demand 
the input of management, to develop procedure based on prioritization of vital assets 
under their stewardship, legal council, to interpret policies within the scope of the 
organization’s activities and ensure procedures fulfill the organization’s obligations, IT 
experts, to implement and maintain information systems in compliance with regulatory 
standards, and all stakeholders involved in the lifecycle of the asset, to operate in 
accordance with established procedures.   
Nevertheless, in recognition of the alarming trend towards insider threats and 
vulnerabilities originating inside the network perimeter, measures such as least privilege 
are incontrovertibly necessary and worth the high initial investment.  Sanyal, Shelat and 
Gupta (2010) cite “It is a well established fact that 70%+ of threats to an organization’s 
network and network-based infrastructure originate from inside” to challenge the 
common practice of corporate information security measures which focus solely on 
defending the network perimeter from incoming threats and intrinsically trusting traffic 
originating from within the network (p. 63).  Baracaldo and Joshi (2010) cite a survey 
estimating that 33% of computer crimes reported in 2010 involved insider attacks and 
comment that some of the attacks could be pre-empted if the access controls “were able 
to react when a user is performing actions that are not appropriate for their normal job 
functions” (p. 167).  Furthermore, the Ponemon Institute LLC (January 2012) survey 
finds that, in the cases where respondents were able to identify the source of the breach, 
34% were attributed to negligent insiders, 19% to outsourcing data to a third party, 16% 
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to malicious insiders and 6% for failure to shred documents (p. 5).  These findings not 
only demonstrate the potential breadth of vulnerabilities lurking within and throughout an 
organization’s human and technological assets, they stress the need to re-evaluate 
foundational information security practices, specifically access control.  
According to the Official (ISC)² Guide to the CISSP CBK, "Access control 
provides the basic building blocks for enabling information security and is the foundation 
upon which all security efforts...are based" (Tiller & Fried, 2010, p. 2).  The two seminal 
electronic data access control models are discretionary access control (DAC) and 
mandatory access control (MAC). DACs are characterized by the data owner’s 
specification of the access control on the resource (i.e., access control is instantiated at 
the data owner's discretion). This model was available in some of the earliest multi-user, 
network computing systems and is currently supported in nearly every mainstream, 
commercial computing system (Tiller & Fried, 2010, p. 116).   
In contrast to DACs, “access control policy decisions [in MACs] are made by a 
central authority, not by the individual owner of an object, and the owner cannot change 
access rights” (Hu et al., 2006, p. 7). The formalization of MACs applied to information 
systems was conceptualized at least since the 1970s in the subject clearance levels and 
object classification levels from the Bell-LaPadula (1973) multilevel security (MLS) 
model and the integrity classes expounded in the Biba (1977) model (Hu, et al. 2006, p. 
7).  However, for many decades MACs were deployed exclusively in military and 
national security information systems; only within the last decade have implementations 
of MACs manifested in commercially available systems.  Security-Enhanced Linux 
(SELinux), originally conceived by the National Security Agency's (NSA) National 
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Information Assurance Research Laboratory (NIARL) as a flexible version of MAC to 
support dynamic security policies then open-sourced and subsequently incorporated into 
several Linux distributions, is one such example (NSA, 2009).  A similar MAC 
subsystem, Windows Integrity Mechanism, based on the Biba model was developed for 
the Microsoft Windows Vista operating system (Microsoft Developer Network, 2007). 
While DACs are advantageous due to their flexibility with respect to custodial 
control this facet also leads to the primary disadvantage that DACs “do not impose any 
control on how information is propagated and used once it has been accessed by users 
authorized to do so” and are therefore open to compromise by malicious agents acting 
under the authorized users’ context (Elmsari & Navathe, 2007, p 807-8).  Additionally 
access privileges assigned through DACs are transitive; an individual to whom the owner 
delegates access may copy data to a less secure destination whereupon the data is 
exposed to a wider audience, possibly unbeknownst to the owner (Hu et al., 2006, p. 6).  
For instance, from a sample of 3328 shared documents retrieved from various P2P 
networks Johnson (2009) discovered 389 unique files leaked from the healthcare industry 
of which approximately 5% could be used for identity theft (p. 10).  The figure may seem 
relatively small however it becomes alarmingly significant when one considers the 
volume and gravity of information within the documents, one of which contained over 
9000 patient identifiers (p. 11).  Extrapolating the industry average cost of $198 per 
record breached, the compromise of this single document would result in approximately 
$1,782,000 damages to the organization (Ponemon, March 2012).   
By contrast MACs “prevent any illegal flow of information” though at the 
expense of a rigid classification system which is conducive to few environments outside 
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of the military thus “in many practical situations, discretionary policies are preferred 
because they offer a better trade-off between security and applicability” (Elmsari & 
Navathe, 2007, p. 808).  For example, in the Bell-LaPadula MLS model, every asset in 
the system (e.g., employee, system, document) is designated a mutually exclusive 
security classification (e.g., unclassified, confidential, secret, top secret).  Two rules, the 
simple security rule and *-property enforce the authorized flow of information in the 
system.  The former states that if a subject (e.g., employee or process) wants to access an 
object (e.g., document) their security classification must be equivalent or higher to the 
object’s.  The latter states that a subject cannot write to an object whose classification is 
lower than the subject’s. Such a model would present enormous challenge for businesses, 
where timely exchange of information throughout the supply chain is critical.  A notable 
approach advocated in current research is the concept of “sticky policies” that transfer 
with the data (Agrawal and Johnson, 2007, p. 278).  Such technology could supplement 
either the DAC or MAC approach by enforcing any business logic introduced by 
stakeholders outside the immediate purview of the steward or delegated consumers of the 
information asset, regardless of the logical location of the document in a file system. 
DACs and MACs represent the extreme poles along an access control continuum 
in terms of authority to prescribe least privilege.  Alternatives have been developed to 
ameliorate these models.  For instance role based access control (RBAC), an extension of 
the MAC model better suited for corporate environments, provides assignment of 
privileges to roles defined as “a collection of permissions to use resources appropriate to 
a person’s job function.”  Flexibility akin to the DAC model is achieved in that “users are 
given authorization to adopt roles” and through delegation of object ownership, though 
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both come at the expense of centralized control (Hu, et al, 2006, p 16, 25).  Despite the 
significant perceived cost associated with implementing RBAC, a survey conducted by 
O’Conner and Loomis (2010) demonstrated an overall positive economic impact from 
implementation of RBAC, quantified at $142.92 per employee, as a result of operational 
efficiencies in terms of access provisioning, policy maintenance and certification (p. 8-9).  
Moreover, RBAC has seen significant adoption since its formalization in 1992, up from 
4% to 13% in 2004 and 41% in 2009 (p. 5). 
Baracaldo & Joshi (2012) voice a strong criticism to RBAC in that it assumes 
trustworthiness is a static property since it doesn’t evaluate potential precursors to an 
insider threat, such as inappropriate Internet activity or successive unauthorized access 
attempts (p. 167).  They extend the RBAC model by including a criterion whereupon a 
user’s trust value, collated from sub-systems which monitor relevant user activity, must 
be validated during the role activation phase (p. 169).  If the user’s trust factor falls below 
the trust threshold established by the system for the designated role set, the validation 
fails.   
Another recent variation is exemplified in the Aeolus architecture of Cheng et al. 
(2012) that proposes an intriguing synthesis of DAC and MAC models in the respective 
tag and label functionality.  Tags provide principals (i.e., users and applications) methods 
for classifying information (e.g., public, financial, medical) (p. 3).  Delegation of the 
principals’ authority on a tag functions in an acyclic graph structure.  This paradigm 
allows for dynamic adaptation in response to evolving business logic in that delegation 
and revocation of access can cascade based on any established edges stemming from the 
vertex at which the privilege is executed (p. 4).  For instance, if a data steward designates 
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custodianship to a stakeholder and this steward’s access is later revoked, the custodian’s 
access is also revoked unless the custodian inherits authorization from a different steward 
in the hierarchy.  Labels prevent unauthorized information leakage between principals 
based on adherence to a logic flowing from the MLS principle of MACs (p. 3).  Each 
principal has two labels: a secrecy label and integrity label.  The secrecy label roughly 
functions under the MLS simple security rule (i.e., a source principle’s secrecy label must 
be a subset of the destination’s) while the integrity rule accomplishes the intent of the *-
property (i.e., a source principal’s integrity level must be the superset of the 
destination’s).  User principals can declassify data by removing a tag from a security 
label or endorse data by adding a tag to an integrity label only if the rules are met and the 
user has the appropriate authorization described in the tag authorization structure (p. 3 – 
4).  These recent examples illustrate the scope of improvements yet to be realized in this 
domain. 
Yet, industry is left to contend with the exponentially compounding concerns of 
information classification and efficient knowledge management.  Porter and Millar 
(1985) portended, “So pervasive is the impact of information technology that it confronts 
executives with a tough problem: too much information” (p. 154).  Commercial software 
offerings have devoted significant attention to isolation and obfuscation of information 
outside a user’s designated role.  For instance, SQL standards compliant DBMSs support 
permutations of access control within a single document structure (i.e., table) through the 
creation of a viewed table using the CREATE VIEW statement and assignment of 
privileges on the viewed table.  For flat file systems hosting unstructured and semi-
structured document types (i.e., network file servers), mechanisms such as Microsoft 
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Corporation’s (2005) Access Based Enumeration and Samba (2010) “hide” configuration 
directives support the creation of directory views derived from access control lists such 
that individuals are only permitted to view in a directory listing those documents for 
which they are granted access.  The feature is marketed based upon both its security 
benefits and potential to increase productivity since “end users see only what files and 
folders they need for their responsibilities rather than spending time looking through lists 
of inaccessible folders and files” (Microsoft Corporation, 2010, p. 1).  This technology 
underscores a subtle facet of access control: the exclusion of individuals who do not 
possess a need to know for the information asset reduces information sprawl for these 
individuals, thereby improving the rate in locating information relevant to the user’s role. 
Early attempts at electronic document redaction have proven cumbersome, ad-hoc 
and unreliable.  Numerous incidents of failed document redaction leading to unauthorized 
information leakage have been publicized.  For example Liptak (2006) reports the 
leakage of grand jury testimony on steroid use in professional baseball when reporters 
were able to recover ostensibly redacted text from a PDF file simply by copying the text 
area into a word processor.  A similar exposure attributed to ineffective redaction is 
reported by Wiley (2005) though, in this case, the leak had significant ramifications on an 
international stage by revealing incriminating US military procedures that may have led 
to the death of an Italian agent.  Forrester and Irwin (2005) enumerate several additional 
examples illuminating the scope of the problem (p. 4).  In all of the cited cases, 
information leakage is attributed to the redacting party’s negligence in sanitizing 
metadata and other hidden artifacts embedded in the electronic record (e.g., covering text 
with a black box in a PDF file is not an effective method for sanitizing the data from the 
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document; c.f., Forrester and Irwin, 2005, 5 – 6).  An NSA (2005) report details an 
effective, though highly elaborate, procedure for eliminating hidden data by converting a 
Microsoft Word document to PDF though the language hints at equivocation in the 
statement,  
“This document does not address all the issues that can arise when distributing or 
downgrading original document formats…Using original source format… can 
entail exceptional risk; the lengthy and complicated procedures for mitigating 
such risks are outside the scope of this note.” (p. 2) 
 
One can envision inordinate opportunities of omission in the eight-step, detailed 
procedure outlined by the document, spanning as many pages. 
Developments in the field of document redaction promise an effective method for 
supporting fine-grained, content-based access control views with comparatively minimal 
effort on the part of the end-user.  Staddon, Golle, Gagné and Rasmussen (2008) propose 
an attribute based encryption protocol for provisioning access control on document 
attributes (i.e., sensitive information identified through natural language processing or 
user generated tags) through authorized distribution of the attribute’s associated 
decryption key.  Staddon et al. contend this approach is efficient since it allows for public 
circulation of a single version of the document while ensuring each user is able to view 
only that information for which they’re authorized (p. 27).   Bier et al. (2009) extend this 
approach by fusing natural language processing methodologies, both for identification of 
explicit sensitive information as well as those attributes, which in combination may lead 
to inference of the information, and user interaction as a compensating control to 
facilitate high precision through iterative refinement.  Both prototypes demonstrate a 
functional framework promising unprecedented capacity for disclosing information while 
maintaining compliance under least privilege mandates.  They improve on previous 
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methods, such as the NSA (2005) report, through seamless integration of redaction and 
sanitization capability along with semi-automatic approaches to identification of sensitive 
elements.  One observation worth noting is that, especially in consideration of the 
potential high cost of failure for overlooking false negatives, it may be more prudent for 
the redaction mechanism to redact all information and allow the data steward to 
deliberately select subsets of data within the document appropriate for sharing among 
stakeholders tangential to the operational need associated with the document. 
 Recalling the prior attestation to the insider threat dilemma, it is instructive to 
consider the attitudes of end users in estimating efficiency of a document access control 
system.  The Hassell (2005) trust model emphasizes affective factors such as 
commitment to a social group and frame of references in the trustee’s cognitive 
evaluation whether to place trust in the entity under scrutiny.  Furthermore, qualities such 
as perceived ease of use and attitude toward using are relevant in an end-users 
consideration of trusting a technology (p. 136 – 138).  If these conditions are not 
satisfactorily met by the end-user’s estimation, the entity will not be trusted (i.e., the end-
user will attempt to evade the access control system by misusing it, working around it or 
ignoring it entirely).  Albrechsten’s (2007) survey of employee satisfaction of 
information security measures taken at an IT firm and bank elucidate this theory.  Based 
on interviews with the employees, Albrechsten detects a latent conflict between 
information security and functionality fulminating in the employees’ perception as daily 
operational demands increase as well as a tendency, at least among the bank employees, 
to distinguish between their individual responsibilities and the responsibilities of 
information security, which in their mind are relegated to the domain of specialists (p. 
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281).  Albrechsten concludes, “the interviewed users consider the costs of cautious 
behavior to be higher than the perceived benefits…Benefits on other areas such as 
usability, efficiency and functionality are achieved by a risky behavior” (p. 286). 
The sentiments of our hypotheses are best exemplified in the following statement 
from Hu et al. (2006): 
“The objectives of an access control system are often described in terms of 
protecting system resources against inappropriate or undesired user access. From 
a business perspective, this objective could just as well be described in terms of 
the optimal sharing of information. After all, the main objective of IT is to make 
information available to users and applications. A greater degree of sharing may 
get in the way of resource protection; in reality, a well-managed and effective 
access control system actually facilitates sharing. A sufficiently fine-grained 
access control mechanism can enable selective sharing of information where in its 
absence, sharing may be considered too risky altogether” (p. 3). 
 
These assertions allude to the ostensibly opposing objectives of IT and the information 
security domain of access controls to simultaneously share and protect data.  Hu et al. 
affirm these are in fact mutually supporting aims in that assurance of authorized and 
sufficient access controls mitigate risk to the organization associated with information 
sharing, thereby facilitating information sharing.   
One notes that even MACs, the strictest extremity of the access control spectrum, 
are susceptible to data breach as a result of targeted attacks; for instance, Rjaibi and Bird 
(2004) cite how colluding parties in different hierarchical clearance levels can take
advantage of locks placed on a resource using a predetermined protocol to establish a 
covert channel (p. 1013).  Recognizing that access controls are fallible and therefore 
sharing of information entails some risk, it is necessary to instill stakeholder confidence 
that the access control will operate sufficiently to “enable selective sharing” according to 
the least privilege principle.  Otherwise as a result of privacy concerns, stakeholders may 
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withhold or falsify information.  El Emam et al. (2009) invoke several statistics 
underscoring this phenomenon among physicians and patients in the US and Canadian 
health-care industry (Introduction, para 1).  Providing stakeholders a means for explicitly 
defining access within the document may alleviate concerns through the participatory act.  
This accords with Albrechsten’s (2007) assessment, “Improving individuals’ knowledge, 
familiarity and control of risk should influence users’ perception of risk, which in turn 
can affect individual behavior” (p. 286). 
Building on Hu et al.’s aforementioned assertions, the research outlined in the 
following sections looks at the effect of access control on information sharing from the 
perspective of whether insufficiently fine-grained access controls unduly exclude 
stakeholders in a network 
Methodology 
It is the purpose of this research to describe the impact of the document-centric 
access control model on an organization’s ability to conduct necessary operations while 
complying with regulatory information security mandates.  This is accomplished through 
the endeavor to measure the efficiency of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
(UNC)’s institutional document repositories in terms of appropriate application of access 
control as it relates to document content and compliance with the least privilege principle. 
These systems ordinarily operate under DACs verbally expressed by the principal data 
steward, generally a department head or manager, and instantiated with the aid of an IT 
administrator.   To form a more detailed impression of the environment under 
consideration the following brief analysis of the policies and procedures governing the 
appropriate disposition of the organization’s information resources is presented. 
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Significantly, according to the UNC Chief Information Office (CIO) “All Users 
must be aware of the classification of the various types of University information to 
which they have access in order to determine the proper controls [for the information]” 
and “…unauthorized disclosure of Sensitive Information to individuals without a 
business need for access may violate laws or University policies and have significant 
ramifications for [the University]” (2011, p. 3).  These statements solidify the burden of 
responsibility on stakeholders to recognize the security implications of each discrete 
piece of information they process and validate the legitimacy of the business need claim 
to sensitive information.  Additionally, “Decisions about the provision of access to 
Sensitive Information must always be made by the Steward […] of that Sensitive 
Information,” implying a DAC model however the depth of delegation authorized is 
ambiguous (p. 3 – 4; c.f., “Responsibility of Sensitive Information may be delegated by 
the Dean, Division Head, or their designee [and this] must be clearly identified in writing 
as such”, p. 9).  Further, “Information must be classified according to the most sensitive 
detail it includes” (p. 3).  This final statement conjures the specter of our original fear that 
optimal information sharing may be interdicted by the presence of highly sensitive 
information in the midst of a document. 
For the purpose of this research, a stakeholder is defined as anyone with a need to 
know any part of the content of a document as determined by the document’s data 
steward.  This distinction essentially aligns with the definition of a Consumer/User in the 
UNC Information Security Policy (c.f., UNC CIO, 2011, p. 4).  The document’s data 
steward is the manager or department chair in whom operational authority and discretion 
for defining access control is invested (i.e., the seed individual from whom transitively 
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defined access may germinate; subsumes the definitions of “Steward of Information or 
Data” and “User Managers”) as well as any authorized designees (c.f., p. 4 – 5).  A 
document is defined as a digital file object stored on an institutional file repository (i.e., 
University managed file server) which is ascribed a set of access control rules. 
Though one might anticipate that information classification should be a highly 
nuanced and therefore a more difficult concept to operationally define, the University 
Information Security Policy mandates a binary classification scheme: information is 
either public or sensitive (UNC CIO, 2011).  The latter is defined generally as regulated 
information while the former is all information that is not sensitive, which must be 
rendered available for public inspection upon request under North Carolina General 
Statute, Chapter 132 (p. 2 – 4).  In practice the DACs facilitate a third type of 
classification: they describe least privilege for the document (i.e., the minimal set of 
individuals who have a direct operational need to access the document) as a function of 
convenience (i.e., preventing users from being overwhelmed with information not 
relevant to their role when browsing the directory structure) and assurance (i.e., the scope 
of users who may alter the document in a manner unintended by the data steward is 
minimal). 
Divining an encompassing efficiency metric for information security procedures 
is confronted contentiously in the literature as demonstrated by Boehmer’s (2008) 
analysis.  Two trends are identified: the Return of Security Investment (ROSI) approach 
and calculations evaluating loss of productiveness (p. 227).  ROSI is essentially the ratio 
of the cost associated with a successful attack on a given asset to the cost associated with 
the proposed security countermeasures to protect that asset.  If the cost of protecting the 
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asset outweighs the cost of an attack then the investment is considered inefficient.  
However, as alluded in the beginning paragraph of the Literature Review Section, it is 
increasingly difficult to measure cost associated with regulatory sanctions and loss in 
consumer confidence.  The second approach, the evaluation of productivity loss, attempts 
to derive capital losses arising from a potential breach incident with respect to work 
stoppage.  Boehmer gives the example of a file server being disrupted and the number of 
effected employees being considered, though the contention is made that a suitable 
benchmark does not exist (2008, p. 227). 
While ROSI and productivity loss are useful factors to consider when evaluating 
the decision to pursue a regimen of security measures, they neglect to consider the 
influence of these technologies on quotidian operations.  In this regard, the Porter Value 
Chain Model is highly instructive.  Porter and Millar (1985) summarize the concept by 
stating “A company’s value chain is a system of interdependent activities, which are 
connected by linkages [established according to the interrelated activities’ influence on 
each other with respect to cost and effectiveness]” (p.150).  These links create a complex 
network consisting of the company’s primary, or external, and support, or internal, 
activities as well as edges connecting affiliates, suppliers and customers.  Through 
optimization of these linkages, either through cost reduction or differentiation with 
respect to the offerings of its rivals, an organization can create competitive advantage.  
Authorized information sharing, especially among an organization’s primary and support 
activities, is crucial in modern enterprises for efficient operations in the relentlessly 
escalating knowledge driven economy.  In consideration of this work, we propose the 
following model for efficiency. 
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Efficiency is the property whereby all stakeholders who may access some part of 
the content of a document are allowed to do so by the access control.  The DAC is 
efficient if 𝛽 − 𝛼 results in an empty set where α is the set of stakeholders defined in the 
DAC (i.e., those who have privileges to the entire document) and β is the set of 
stakeholders who have an operational need, as determined by the data steward, to access 
some part of the document.  Efficiency of access control lists can thus be defined as 𝛼 ∩ 𝛽𝛼  
where a value of zero represents complete inefficiency and one represents perfect 
efficiency.   
Several assumptions are made in order to carry out the research.  First, the axiom 𝛽   >   0 is adopted (i.e., at the very least the data steward has a need to know the 
information).  Additionally, the assumption is made that 𝛽 ⊆ 𝛼 (i.e., the DAC is 
effective; no stakeholder outside the set of individuals for whom an operational need 
exists to access the document is authorized to do so).  While consideration of the 
effectiveness of DACs is a worthy topic of future research, it is beyond the scope of the 
current inquiry.  Finally, from 𝛽   >   0 and 𝛽 ⊆ 𝛼 one may infer 𝛼   >   0. 
To obtain the requisite data for the proposed research, an electronic survey 
(Qualtrics, Provo, UT) is distributed to the population of UNC faculty and staff via the 
University’s mass mail protocol (UNC CIO, 2012).  An initial invitation email, 
Addendum I, is sent on 2/6/2013 to the population to recruit participants and a second 
invitation, Addendum II, is sent on 2/13/2013. As of September 2012, the size of the 
population is estimated at 11,900 individuals (UNC Office of Institutional Research and 
Assessment, 2012).  
 19 
To protect the privacy of participants and alleviate any burden of liability to 
disclose any behavior in violation of organizational policy potentially discovered during 
the course of the research, submissions are recorded anonymously; the only information 
collected from the survey besides the responses are the time at which the survey is 
retrieved from the Qualtrics system by the participant, the time at which the participant 
completes the survey and a unique session code to identify the survey.  The survey 
attempts to measure four principal variables: efficiency, content variance as a function of 
organizational role, content variance as a function of organizational or regulatory 
classifications and willingness of the steward to use fine-grained access controls for the 
particular document.  The survey consists of six questions, including an optional 
opportunity to leave feedback.  A discussion follows of the survey content and 
measurement of variables. 
Figure 1 
 
Prospective participants are greeted with the prompt in Figure 1 upon clicking the URL to 
the survey and authenticating with the shared password.  The intent of the greeting is 
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threefold: to provide some background information to inform the participant of the 
purpose of the study, to convey an informed consent notification and to instruct the 
participant on how to select a relevant document for responding to questions in 
subsequent sections.  Upon clicking the arrow button in the bottom right corner of the 
window, the survey proceeds to the next screen, in this instance Figure 2 (herein Q1). 
Figure 2 / Q1 
 
Q1 asks the participant to count the number of individuals with access to the file 
and record the value in the input field as a whole number.  A potential dilemma affecting 
the validity of this approach is discussed in the Limitations section.  Briefly, due to 
inadequacies with the user interface and the segregation of the data steward and custodian 
(i.e., individual responsible for implementing the access control) roles (c.f., “Access 
controls must be defined by the Steward and implemented by the Custodian…” UNC 
CIO, 2011, p. 12) the data steward may not be able to directly interpret the access control 
and may rather rely on memory of their definition of the access control from a point in 
time.  To mitigate any inaccuracy deriving from this limitation it is stressed in Figure 1 
that the participant selects a document for which they’re the “primary author/owner” to 
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better ensure their familiarity and continuous involvement with the business and access 
requirements. 
Figure 3 / Q2a 
 
The objective of Figure 3 (herein Q2a) is to elicit evidence of access control 
efficiency, or lack thereof, from an indicative behavior.  The act of distributing the file 
through the enumerated alternative methods amounts to circumvention of the access 
control implementation and harkens back to the disadvantage expounded in the Literature 
Review that the DAC model supports transitive delegation of authority to potentially less 
secure destinations. 
Figure 4 / Q2b 
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If the ‘Yes’ response is recorded the survey directs to Figure 4 (herein Q2b).  Q2b 
allows the participant to further expand the answer by giving an approximation of how 
many people the file has been distributed to outside of those authorized by the access 
control in the form of a whole number.  If the ‘No’ response is recorded the survey skips 
Q2b, coding the response as zero, and proceeds to Figure 5 (herein Q3). 
Figure 5 / Q3 
 
Q3 attempts to capture the aspect of content variation as a function of stakeholder 
roles.  This is measured in terms of an ordinal scale.  The first choice represents entire 
uniformity of content with respect to roles (i.e., weighted response is coded as zero) and 
the fourth represents high variation (i.e., weighted response is coded as three).  The 
statements are meant to invoke the aspect of least privilege in relation to the individual’s 
accessing the document and the information contained within the document. 
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Figure 6 / Q4 
 
Figure 6 (herein Q4) conveys the document classification aspect of the research 
study in the form of an interval scale.  Each classification is assigned a value of one and 
the summation is taken to represent the variance of content with respect to data 
classification.  Thus, the value may range from one, since all University data is classified 
as either public or one of the five enumerated sensitive classifications, to six (i.e., the 
chosen document contains data covering all five sensitive categories as well as 
information serving public interest). 
Additionally it should be observed the classifications are not mutually exclusive 
(e.g., a transcript of a teaching clinician’s interview with a patient may contain PHI of the 
patient, FERPA if a student clinician is assisting in diagnosis and Non-public information 
if research is being conducted).  Indeed it is the objective of the question to measure to 
what extent information assets exhibit multiple classifications within a single entity.  
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However it is presumed to be a rare occurrence that all six should be found in the same 
document. 
Figure 7 / Q5a 
  
The response from Figure 7 (herein Q5a) represents on a binary scale the 
willingness of the steward to utilize fine-grained access control for the document under 
scrutiny.  The responses are coded identically to the scheme used in Q2.  If the ‘Yes’ 
response is recorded the survey directs to Figure 8 (herein Q5b). 
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Figure 8 / Q5b 
 
Figure 9 / Q6 
 
Finally, the participant is presented with Figure 9 (herein Q6) and the conclusion of the 
survey.  Q1, Q2 and Q5b represent ratio data for computing the efficiency measure 
(herein DAC ES). 
𝐷𝐴𝐶  𝐸𝑆 = 𝑄1− (𝑄2𝑏 + 𝑄5𝑏)𝑄1  
Q2 and Q5 attempt to couch the inquiry in terms of a behavioral response in order to 
reduce bias and encourage verisimilitude.  The summation of the ratio values associated 
with these questions results in an approximation of β.  Significantly, there is no explicit 
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lower bound to the efficiency score since the survey reduces the information from a 
comparison of access control sets to raw integers. 
Bivariate analysis shall be conducted to determine relationships between the 
dependent variable, the DAC ES, and the independent variables represented by Q3, Q4 
and Q5a.  To reject the null hypothesis for H₂, significance is considered at the 𝑝   ≤    .05 
level.  
Limitations 
The limitations of this research are manifold.  Babbie (2010) discusses several 
relevant concerns related to survey research (p. 257 – 262).  The dimensions of 
participant’s willingness to respond and the perceived relevance of the topic are difficult 
to gauge conclusively though studies such as Albrechsten (2007) suggest security is a 
tertiary concern to end users next to convenience and operational efficiency.  Data 
breaches at UNC such as the Carolina Mammography Registry incident lend credence to 
this assertion’s applicability in the population under scrutiny (c.f., Barber, 2010, 
“[steward] was negligent in assigning security duties without granting additional training 
to [the custodian]”).  Such circumstances may cultivate consternation for proffering 
information related to security practices though it is intended that the precautions taken to 
ensure anonymity mitigate this concern in prospective participants. 
There are certainly reliability problems related to document classification.  
Different individuals may classify the same document differently or make different 
determinations of appropriate access as regards the least privilege doctrine based on a 
variety of factors: familiarity with internal policy and regulatory mandates, operational 
deadlines or other external pressures, misappraisal of associated risks, etc.  This may 
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indicate a fundamental problem with the DAC model altogether; most assuredly the 
successful implementation of the model depends on the discretionary reliability of data 
stewards.  It would be interesting to look at an effectiveness measure in future research 
considering accuracy of classification. 
In the Methodology section, a validity limitation for Q1 was referenced.  
Specifically, it should be noted that if the individual responsible for implementing the 
access control follows published best practices for group nesting on Windows Server 
systems (e.g., Holme, Ruest, Ruest & Northrup, 2008, p. 153 – 155; Microsoft TechNet, 
2005), the data steward may not be able to interpret who currently has access to the 
particular file since only the domain local groups for the resource (i.e., those groups 
dedicated to expressing a distinct access privilege for the respective object) are visible to 
the data steward from the access control entry interface. 
For instance, Figure 10 displays the common access control entry user interface 
on Microsoft Windows systems; in order to accurately interpret who has modify access to 
the file solely based on information obtained from this view it would be necessary for the 
data steward to issue a query such as the one depicted in Figure 11.  Dyché (2009) posits 
that the exact nature of data stewardship will differ across organizations given the 
specific problems the governance initiative is attempting to address though “as IT 
educates on the value of data stewardship, it’s important the role is seen as a bridge 
between IT and the business…deploying information in a consistent and structured 
way…” (p. 12).  How organizations deal with the practical issues of security group 
maintenance and align this with a unified data governance strategy may be a valuable 
topic for future research though it is not fully considered in this paper.  In order to not 
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presume a particular procedure on any of the varied participant pools surveyed by this 
research, the ideal DAC recalled by the participant is held as authoritative. 
Figure 10 
 
Figure 11 
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External validity is another limitation inherent in research related to this topic.  
Although information classification and access control practices are influenced by 
generally applicable variables such as regulatory standards and commercially available 
software features, the character and quality of these concepts is perhaps determined to a 
greater extent by the organizational culture: a small firm founded from venture capital 
may decide to grant everyone access to everything since loss of efficiency can result in 
the death of the company while a national intelligence agency may operate at a high loss 
of access control efficiency since leaked information can result in the death of an 
employee.  A meta-analysis of data collected from a variety of organizations may begin
to converge on generalizable results however this information would attenuate the 
characteristics of document classification and content variance particular to any given 
organization and therefore be of less utility in terms of developing an appropriate access 
control protocol for the organization.  
Analysis 
Our hypotheses predict the survey data should demonstrate that access control 
applied to an entire document is inefficient when multiple information classifications are 
subsumed and stakeholders of varying security clearances, or organization roles, are 
served by the document.  The research stands to benefit UNC directly by offering better 
insight into access control practices.  The claims may be extended to other NC higher 
education, public institutions though, as mentioned earlier, generalizability is problematic 
due to individual variations with respect to organizational culture.  For instance, a 
particular NC higher education, public institution may not deal with HIPAA regulated 
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information to the extent UNC does if the institution lacks a hospital or medical research 
department. 
The survey received 91 submissions total however only 52 were complete.  The 
39 incomplete responses were discarded from the response set.  Table 1 summarizes the 
queries and DAC ES expounded in the Methodology section while Figure 12 depicts the 
distribution of the responses. 
Table 1 
 
Item Description 
Q3 To what degree does the respondent consider the chosen document’s content to conform to the 
least privilege requirement with respect to all stakeholder roles accessing the document?  Full 
Uniformity implies no benefit from redaction.  Insignificant Disparity implies redaction would 
accomplish least privilege but the perceived risk value of content is low so benefit is minimal.  
Marginal Disparity indicates that certain individuals should be prevented from modifying parts 
of the document and implies an integrity benefit.  Significant Disparity indicates certain 
individuals should be prevented from viewing parts of the document and implies a benefit to 
confidentiality. 
Q4 How many different types of distinct regulatory or institutional classifications? 
Q5a Would the respondent use a redaction system to share parts of the document content with 
individuals who do not currently have access? 
DAC ES Subtract the number of individuals who have been granted access to the document through 
circumvention of the document access control (i.e., Q2a) plus any individuals counted in Q5a 
from the total number of individuals with access (i.e., Q1) and divide by Q1 to produce ratio of 
relative efficiency reflecting the degree to which stakeholders are denied access to relevant 
content due to lack of precision of the document access control.  
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Figure 12 
 
The responses for Q3 were re-labeled for clarity.  The Full Uniformity label corresponds 
with response one, Insignificant Disparity with response two and so on.  Further, 
collapsing the responses of Q3 into a binary nominal scale between uniformity and 
disparity the data shows that, in the majority of surveyed cases, the steward judged the 
content to be uniform in consideration of the business need to know of the various 
stakeholders with whom the document is shared by a ratio of 31:21.  As anticipated Q4 
conveys that of the surveyed documents, the majority of cases were reported to contain 
only one regulatory classification of information.  None of the surveyed cases were 
reported to contain more than four of the classifications.  The DAC ES resulted in two 
outliers, which skewed the data by conveying a negative mean (i.e., majority of cases 
were inefficient).  In fact, about 42% of the cases were purported to be efficient (i.e., 
DAC ES = 1). 
 32 
Figure 13 
 
Reflecting on the distribution of responses the DAC ES, Q3 and Q4 variables are 
reduced to binary nominal data.  In DAC ES, all values below one are grouped into the 
Inefficient category and all values equal to one are Efficient.  In Q4, all values above one 
are grouped as Multiple Classification while all values equal to one are grouped as Single 
Classification.  For Q3 all of the disparity categories are grouped together.  The results of 
this are displayed in Figure 13. 
Thus, with all variables represented in a binary nominal form the test is used to 
determine if a relationship exists between the DAC ES and the independent variables 
represented by Q3, Q4 and Q5a.  The results are represented in Figure 14.  A discussion 
and interpretation of the data follows. 
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Figure 14 
 
 
The survey data supports a positive relationship between Q5a, the steward’s 
willingness to use a redaction mechanism and the efficiency of the current access control 
associated with the document (i.e., the steward is likely to state they would use redaction 
if the current document access control prevents stakeholders from accessing relevant 
information while they’re unlikely to express willingness where the document access 
control is judged to be efficient).  One would logically anticipate such an observation.  
Interestingly, though no steward purported they’d use redaction controls on a document 
with an efficient DAC, eight cases claimed they’d not use redaction with an inefficient 
DAC.  This may be interpreted in several ways: it may indicate the latent conflict 
between security and functionality noted by Albrechsten (2007), a mismatch between the 
steward’s perceived risk of sharing information and the benefit of sharing the information 
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with other stakeholders, or perhaps these are simply cases where the utility of sharing 
additional information is judged not to be worth the expected cost in effort of marking up 
the document at a more granular degree. 
Figure 15 aggregates the Q5a and DAC ES contingency table by Q3 and Q4 
respectively to further investigate this observation.  The intent is to show among the 
respondents who answered they would not use redaction on an inefficient DAC to share 
information with stakeholders precluded from accessing the document, how many of 
these documents reportedly contained multiple regulatory classifications or disparate role 
versus content alignment.  If the majority of responses did not fall into either category 
one might draw the conclusion that the effort versus perceived utility explains the 
response since these factors do not necessarily indicate a need to specify further access 
control.  While the distribution primarily falls into the Single regulatory classification 
category, at a ratio of 7:1, the responses are evenly distributed along the dimension of 
role alignment and document content.  However, one may argue that neither presents a 
persuasive result to explain the underlying contributing factor given the low number of 
responses. 
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Figure 15 
 
The data does not support rejection of the null hypothesis for Q3 or Q4.  Tertiary 
factors such as sampling error based on the fact that the responses only reflect individuals 
in the population willing to complete the survey, the ability of the data steward to 
accurately classify information, or the failure of the survey to not capture valid responses 
cast doubt on the findings.  Sentiment analysis of Q6 indicates at least four of the 
respondents found the intent or presentation of the survey confusing.  Of these, two 
answered they would use redaction to share the document with a wider audience but 
didn’t indicate with how many individuals they’d include (i.e., Q5b for these respondents 
was zero).  This inconsistency supports Albrechsten’s (2007) interpretation of a gap 
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between security talk and action among employees where few security tasks are 
performed in their current roles yet the employees express motivation to perform such 
actions (p. 284). 
Twenty responses included a comment for Q6.  Figure 16 depicts a sentiment 
analysis of the comments along the following dimensions: redaction is not relevant to the 
respondent’s role, the respondent expresses a positive opinion of using redaction in a 
workflow, the respondent expresses a negative opinion towards redaction.  A value of 
one indicates the sentiment is expressed in the comment while zero indicates the 
sentiment is not expressed by the comment.  The sum attribute represents overlapping 
sentiments in the individual comments. 
 
Among the six comments expressing none of the enumerated sentiments (i.e., sum 
= 0), three convey confusion over the survey, one lauds the sharing capability of the 
Dropbox service while mentioning they take care not to use it for “protected 
information,” one cites a procedure for sending a document for manual redaction to the 
legal council’s office in the event of public information request and one indicates that 
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while the data in the document under consideration is not “confidential” they “tend not to 
share it outside of the committee.”  The latter respondent categorized the document as 
public in Q4 and indicated that if redaction were available the document could be shared 
with approximately ten additional individuals.  One assumes then this document 
represents the class of using access control as a way of suppressing information that is 
judged to be non-relevant to roles outside of a group yet the indication that redaction may 
be considered suggests that some of the information in the document may be classified as 
“company confidential” (i.e., the ten individuals should not be able to view the redacted 
information).  This implies a further need to extend the classification scheme to include a 
category for “company confidential” (i.e., information that wouldn’t cause harm if 
exposed though is generally not relevant to positions outside of a given set of roles). 
Of the three comments expressing two of the enumerated sentiments, one falls 
into the not relevant to the respondent’s role and positive categories: “Not necessary for 
my work but very cool feature :).”  The other two express both positive and negative 
opinions.  The first states, “I think I'd simply rather not share a document than redact 
portions and share it, but if I could go back to the previous question I'd probably change 
my answer to yes.”  This comment was also counted among the comments expressing 
confusion over the survey since they indicated a desire to change an answer upon 
completing the survey; the other three comments conveying confusion with the survey 
were more explicit (e.g., “I didn't feel this survey was very clear as to the intent of the 
questions.”).  The second of these comments reads,  
“I wouldn't use a tool that required me to manually redact each item. If there were 
a tool to do this semi-automatically (afterwhich I could do quality control) and 
also could check to make sure information would no longer lead to identification 
of individuals, I would consider it - depending on how much time would be 
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required to process the data and how much time were available to me to learn how 
to use tools and apply them.” 
 
The latter comment encapsulates many important criteria for a redaction access control to 
meet in order to better ensure stakeholder satisfaction and underscores features 
expounded in Bier et al. (2009).  For example, the respondent indicates the system should 
provide some functionality for assisting with the detection of candidate elements for 
redaction though ultimately the utility of such a feature is dependent on time involved in 
using the system and the learning curve associated with the new technology. 
Another interesting trend is the discussion of workarounds to the problem.  Five 
comments allude to the practice of manually partitioning documents based on sensitive 
information and utility of sharing subsets of classified data with certain stakeholders.  
Two of these cite the opinion that redaction has a negative connotation, that it is 
distracting and may cause resentment among stakeholders, and they’d prefer either not to 
share a document or manual partition it into multiple documents so that no data is 
ostensibly obfuscated.  In contrast one respondent cites this practice and laments “Right 
now we have multiple versions of files and it gets confusing/potential for errors and 
inadvertent disclosure.”  Yet another describes a process of affixing confidential notes to 
an electronic document after it has been printed to keep the two separate.  The fifth 
comment in this category is the individual who mentioned sending the document to legal 
council for redaction.  This comment didn’t necessarily have a negative or positive 
opinion of the process.   
These distinctions reveal some interesting differences in organizational cultural 
which deserve consideration prior to deployment of a redaction access control system.  
To address the negative sentiments, alternative approaches such as the Active 
 39 
Enforcement technology of Agrawal and Johnson’s (2007) Hippocratic Database System 
may be used for internal stakeholders to re-write queries posed to an institutional 
repository search engine based on role and business rules so that redaction is 
accomplished in a more subtle way.  Further, the analysis suggests many avenues for 
future research.  Clearly prototyping of a system among stakeholders in sensitive roles 
that routinely interface with other stakeholder roles which do not possess a need to know 
for the types of information accessed by the primary group.  Doctors who work with 
researchers and students are one example.  Several different implementation approaches 
are suggested from the survey data including an approach for redacting documents by 
section to produce multiple versions, dynamic views of a document to improve upon the 
manual process of partitioning and managing multiple versions of a document.  More 
data on measuring the aptitude of various stakeholder groups to accurately classify 
documents based on all relevant regulations, statutes and organizational policies would 
also be invaluable for tuning such a system. 
It is the position of this research to support the accepted practice of granting least 
privilege to information assets however the contention is made that this practice is 
untenable in the current environment.  Data stewards are placed in the intractable position 
of reconciling layers of policy legalese with quotidian operational needs.  If it is the case 
that the access control mechanism does not facilitate reconciliation in every case, one 
may expect inconsistent results placing the organization at risk of lost efficiency through 
interruption to workflow confluence.  
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Conclusion 
Information classification is a critical function for organizations, specifically 
those processing sensitive information.  Access control is the primary method for 
instantiating classification for information assets.  Through a case study of a DAC 
implementation, this research explores whether the widely implemented practice of 
defining access control at the document layer is efficient.  An efficiency model is 
proposed which accounts for individuals who have a need to access discrete segments of 
a document in proportion to individuals who have a need to access the entire document.  
Data stewards are surveyed in order to determine to what extent they consider the 
document as one logical unit or an amalgamation of classifications with multifaceted 
segments of varying utility to diverse sets of stakeholders.  The initial hypothesis 
anticipated that the document-centric approach, though perhaps sufficient for certain 
innocuous information or documents of strict content uniformity, is not efficient when 
content varies in classification.  Our research does not cogently support such a claim in 
an absolute sense, however it does suggest that there is awareness among stewards as to 
inefficiencies where potentially valuable information is withheld from stakeholders due 
to current access controls and in such cases the stewards are willing to use a redaction 
access control.  Integrating redaction into document processing stands to efficiently 
facilitate granular data classification while improving the availability of relevant 
information to key stakeholders.  The challenge remains to introduce such a system and 
cultivate acceptance among data stewards.
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Addendum I 
Received: from mxip1i.isis.unc.edu (152.2.0.74) by ITS-MSXHT0.ad.unc.edu 
 (172.27.172.65) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.328.9; Wed, 6 Feb 
 2013 21:35:01 -0500 
X-RemoteIP: 152.2.1.138 
X-Group: OVERRIDELIST 
X-Policy: $BYPASS_SBRS 
X-MID: 930677954 
X-SBRS: 1.6 
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true 
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: 
ArYGAH0SE1GYAgGKdGdsb2JhbABFDq4LkjcWDgEMFQg7gh8BAQEFAQEVbyM
LDwwKDwxDEhuHdgyuR4UqiQoEjQ2BIYMnA4hmjTuTElyBUQ 
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.84,619,1355115600";  
   d="scan'208";a="930677955" 
Received: from notify.isis.unc.edu ([152.2.1.138])  by mxip1i.isis.unc.edu 
 with ESMTP; 06 Feb 2013 21:35:01 -0500 
Received: from notify.isis.unc.edu (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by 
 notify.isis.unc.edu (8.13.6/8.14.3) with ESMTP id r172Yx6i028726; Wed, 6 Feb 
 2013 21:34:59 -0500 (EST) 
Received: (from root@localhost) by notify.isis.unc.edu (8.13.6/8.13.6/Submit 
 id r172YxBq028725; Wed, 6 Feb 2013 21:34:59 -0500 (EST) 
Date: Wed, 6 Feb 2013 21:34:59 -0500 
Message-ID: <201302070234.r172YxBq028725@notify.isis.unc.edu> 
Subject: Message 10642 Sent: INFORMATIONAL: Seeking Participants for Information 
Security Study 
To: <massmail-employees@listserv.unc.edu>, <deric_freeman@unc.edu> 
From: <massmail@unc.edu> 
MIME-Version: 1.0 
Content-Type: text/plain 
Return-Path: root@notify.isis.unc.edu 
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthSource: ITS-MSXHT0.ad.unc.edu 
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthAs: Anonymous 
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AVStamp-Mailbox: MSFTFF;1;0;0 0 0 
 
Hi, 
 
I'm contacting you today as a graduate student of the UNC School of 
Information and Library Science.  Under the supervision of faculty 
advisor Arcot Rajasekar, I am conducting research on the impact of
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current document access control practices to influence sufficient 
information sharing within heavily regulated environments such as UNC's 
teaching and research activities.  This brief, voluntary survey asks you 
to answer questions related to a shared document for which you're 
attributed the role of primary data steward or custodian (i.e., 
individual responsible for interpreting who has a business need to 
access the information). 
 
All responses are anonymized prior to submission.  The objective of our 
research is to form an understanding of access control decisions in a 
production system and use this knowledge to test our hypothesis on the 
use of alternative technologies which may offer improved availability of 
information and end-user control as compared to the current methods. 
This research has received approval from the UNC Non-Biomedical IRB 
under the title "Describing 
the Impact of Document Content Variance on Access Control Efficiency and 
A Proposed Solution for Improving Efficiency:  Fine-grained, Redactive 
Access Control Models", IRB #13-1008 approved on 1/31/2013 
non-biomedical 
 
Thank you for your valuable consideration in this effort. 
 
Survey Link: https://unc.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_1F9S23d6gd8KOZ7 
Password: 8capSoap# 
 
PI: Deric Freeman 
Email: deric_freeman@unc.edu 
Phone: 9199669171 
 
FA: Arcot Rajasekar 
Email: rajasekar@unc.edu 
Phone: 9199663611 
 
 
This email is sponsored by: School of Information and Library Science 
 
===============================================================
===== 
"INFORMATIONAL:" email will only be sent to those who have indicated 
that they do want to receive mass email. To set your informational mass 
email preference, sign into MyUNC at http://my.unc.edu, and select 
"Update Personal Information".
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Addendum II 
Received: from mxip3i.isis.unc.edu (152.2.2.195) by ITS-MSXHT0.ad.unc.edu 
 (172.27.172.65) with Microsoft SMTP Server (TLS) id 14.2.328.9; Wed, 13 Feb 
 2013 21:14:10 -0500 
X-RemoteIP: 152.2.1.138X-Group: OVERRIDELIST 
X-Policy: $BYPASS_SBRS 
X-MID: 876598432 
X-SBRS: 1.6 
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Filtered: true 
X-IronPort-Anti-Spam-Result: 
AnYHADpHHFGYAgGKdGdsb2JhbABEDq4fkkIWDgEMFQg7gh8BAQEFAQEVWx
QjCyUPDEMSG4d3tmyJDwSNNoRKA4hmjT6TGl2BVA 
X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.84,660,1355115600";  
   d="scan'208";a="876598433" 
Received: from notify.isis.unc.edu ([152.2.1.138])  by mxip3i.isis.unc.edu 
 with ESMTP; 13 Feb 2013 21:14:10 -0500 
Received: from notify.isis.unc.edu (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by 
 notify.isis.unc.edu (8.13.6/8.14.3) with ESMTP id r1E2DtSw008259; Wed, 13 Feb 
 2013 21:13:55 -0500 (EST) 
Received: (from root@localhost) by notify.isis.unc.edu (8.13.6/8.13.6/Submit) 
 id r1E2DtRS008258; Wed, 13 Feb 2013 21:13:55 -0500 (EST) 
Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2013 21:13:55 -0500 
Message-ID: <201302140213.r1E2DtRS008258@notify.isis.unc.edu> 
Subject: Message 10667 Sent: INFORMATIONAL: Last Chance to Participate in 
Information Security Study 
To: <massmail-employees@listserv.unc.edu>, <deric_freeman@unc.edu> 
From: <massmail@unc.edu> 
MIME-Version: 1.0 
Content-Type: text/plain 
Return-Path: root@notify.isis.unc.edu 
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthSource: ITS-MSXHT0.ad.unc.edu 
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AuthAs: Anonymous 
X-MS-Exchange-Organization-AVStamp-Mailbox: MSFTFF;1;0;0 0 0 
 
This is a reminder of the impending closure of our survey on document 
access control practices for the UNC Non-Biomedical IRB approved study 
titled "Describing the Impact of Document Content Variance on Access 
Control Efficiency and A Proposed Solution for Improving Efficiency: 
Fine-grained, Redactive Access Control Models",  #13-1008 approved on 
1/31/2013.
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If you haven't yet responded to the survey please take a moment to 
consider completing the short survey (average time to complete ~6 
minutes, 56 seconds).  If you have submitted the survey, we sincerely 
appreciate your participation in this effort.  All responses must be in 
by next Wednesday, 2/20/2013. 
 
PI: Deric Freeman 
Email: deric_freeman@unc.edu 
Phone: 9199669171 
 
FA: Arcot Rajasekar 
Email: rajasekar@unc.edu 
Phone: 9199663611 
 
 
This email is sponsored by: School of Information and Library Science 
 
===============================================================
===== 
"INFORMATIONAL:" email will only be sent to those who have indicated 
that they do want to receive mass email. To set your informational mass 
email preference, sign into MyUNC at http://my.unc.edu, and select 
"Update Personal Information". 
